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Abstract
We adapt an information theory analysis of interacting cogni-
tive biological and social modules to the problem of the global
neuronal workspace, the current standard neuroscience pic-
ture of consciousness. Tunable punctuation emerges in a nat-
ural manner, suggesting the possibility of fitting appropriate
phase transition power law, and, away from transition, gen-
eralized Onsager relation expressions, to observational data
on conscious reaction. The development can be extended in
a straightforward manner to include the role of psychosocial
stress, culture, or other embedding structured contexts in in-
dividual consciousness, producing a ‘biopsychosocial’ model
that closely retains the flavor of the standard treatment, but
better meets compelling philosophical and other objections to
brain-only descriptions.
Key words: asymptotic limit theorems, cognition, con-
sciousness, Dretske, information theory, Onsager relations,
phase transition, renormalization.
Introduction
A recent special issue of Cognition (79(1-2), 2001)) explores
contemporary work on consciousness in humans, presenting
various aspects of the new ‘standard model’ synthesized over
the last decade or so (esp. Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
Sergeant and Dehaene (2004) describe that work, and some
of the implicit controversy, as follows:
“[A growing body of empirical study shows] large
all-or-none changes in neural activity when a stimu-
lus fails to be [consciously] reported as compared to
when it is reported... [A] qualitative difference be-
tween unconscious and conscious processing is gen-
erally expected by theories that view recurrent in-
teractions between distant brain areas as a nec-
essary condition for conscious perception... One
of these theories has proposed that consciousness
is associated with the interconnection of multiple
areas processing a stimulus by a [dynamic] ‘neu-
ronal workspace’ within which recurrent connec-
tions allow long-distance communication and auto-
amplification of the activation. Neuronal network
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simulations... suggest the existence of a fluctuating
dynamic threshold. If the primary activation evoked
by a stimulus exceeds this threshold, reverberation
takes place and stimulus information gains access,
through the workspace, to a broad range of [other
brain] areas allowing, among other processes, ver-
bal report, voluntary manipulation, voluntary action
and long-term memorization. Below this thresh-
old, however, stimulus information remains unavail-
able to these processes. Thus the global neuronal
workspace theory predicts an all-or-nothing tran-
sition between conscious and unconscious percep-
tion... More generally, many non-linear dynamical
systems with self-amplification are characterized by
the presence of discontinuous transitions in internal
state...”
Parallel to this line of research, but without invocation of
dynamic systems theory, is what Adams (2003) has character-
ized as ‘the informational turn in philosophy’, that is, the ap-
plication of communication theory formalism and concepts to
“purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and... the
naturalization of mind and meaning”. One of the first com-
prehensive attempts was that of Dretske (1981, 1988, 1992,
1993, 1994), whose work Adams describes as follows:
“It is not uncommon to think that information
is a commodity generated by things with minds.
Let’s say that a naturalized account puts matters
the other way around, viz. it says that minds are
things that come into being by purely natural causal
means of exploiting the information in their environ-
ments. This is the approach of Dretske as he tried
consciously to unite the cognitive sciences around
the well-understood mathematical theory of commu-
nication...”
Dretske himself (1994) writes:
“Communication theory can be interpreted as
telling one something important about the condi-
tions that are needed for the transmission of infor-
mation as ordinarily understood, about what it takes
for the transmission of semantic information. This
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has tempted people... to exploit [information the-
ory] in semantic and cognitive studies, and thus in
the philosophy of mind.
...Unless there is a statistically reliable channel of
communication between [a source and a receiver]...
no signal can carry semantic information... [thus]
the channel over which the [semantic] signal arrives
[must satisfy] the appropriate statistical constraints
of communication theory.”
Here we redirect attention from the informational content
or meaning of individual symbols, i.e. the province of seman-
tics which so concerned Dretske, back to the statistical prop-
erties of long, internally-structured paths of symbols emit-
ted by an information source. We will then import a variety
of tools from statistical physics to produce dynamically tun-
able punctuated or phase transition coupling between inter-
acting cognitive modules in what we claim is a highly nat-
ural manner. As Dretske so clearly saw, this approach al-
lows scientific inference on the necessary conditions for cogni-
tion, and, we will show, greatly illuminates dynamic neuronal
workspace models of consciousness without raising the 18th
Century ghosts of noisy, distorted mechanical clocks inherent
to dynamic systems theory. It also opens the way for an ex-
tended dynamic workspace model which includes the effects
of other interacting cognitive modules or embedding contexts
that may, although acting at slower timescales, profoundly af-
fect individual consciousness. This extension meets profound
objections to brain-only models, for example those of Ben-
nett and Hacker (2003), which we will consider in more detail
below.
Before entering the formal thicket, it is important to high-
light several points.
First, information theory is notorious for providing exis-
tence theorems whose representation, to use physics jargon,
is arduous. For example, although the Shannon Coding The-
orem implied the possibility of highly efficient coding schemes
as early as 1949, it took more than forty years for practical
‘turbo codes’ to actually be constructed. The research pro-
gram we implicitly propose here is unlikely to be any less
difficult.
Second, we are invoking information theory variants of the
fundamental limit theorems of probability. These are inde-
pendent of exact mechanisms, but constrain the behavior of
those mechanisms. For example, although not all processes
involve long sums of independent stochastic variables, those
that do, regardless of the individual variable distribution, col-
lectively follow a Normal distribution as a consequence of the
Central Limit Theorem. Similarly, the games of chance in
a Las Vegas casino are all quite different, but nonetheless
the success of strategies for playing them is strongly and sys-
tematically constrained by the Martingale Theorem, regard-
less of game details. We similarly propose that languages-
on-networks and languages-that-interact, as a consequence of
the limit theorems of information theory, will inherently be
subject to regularities of tunable punctuation and general-
ized Onsager relations, regardless of detailed mechanisms, as
important as the latter may be.
Just as parametric statistics are imposed, at least as a first
approximation, on sometimes questionable experimental sit-
uations, relying on the robustness of the Central Limit The-
orem to carry us through, we will pursue a similar heuristic
approach here.
Finally, we invoke an obvious homology between informa-
tion source uncertainty and thermodynamic free energy den-
sity as justification for importing renormalization and gen-
eralized Onsager relation formalism to the study of cogni-
tive process near and away from ‘critical points’ in the cou-
pling of cognitive submodules. The question of whether we
are demonstrating the necessity of global phase transitions in
information-transmission networks or merely building a sug-
gestive analogy with thermodynamics is an empirical one be-
yond our present ability to answer, although for the micro-
scopic case, Feynman (1996) has shown that the homology
is an identity, which is no small matter and indeed suggests
that phase transition behavior should be ubiquitous for cer-
tain classes of information systems.
Our work is likely analogous, in a certain sense, to Bohr’s
treatment of the atom, which attempted a simple substitu-
tion of quantized angular momentum into a basically classi-
cal theory. Although incomplete, that analysis contributed
materially to the more comprehensive approaches of quan-
tum mechanics, relativistic quantum mechanics, and quantum
electrodynamics. In that spirit we hope that increasingly sat-
isfactory models will follow from what we do here.
We begin with a description of cognitive process in terms
of an information source, a kind of language constrained by
the Shannon-McMillan or Asymptotic Equipartition Theo-
rem, and its Rate Distortion or Joint Asymptotic Equipar-
tition and other variants for interacting sources.
Cognition as language
Atlan and Cohen (1998) and Cohen (2000), following a long
tradition in the study of immune cognition (e.g., Grossman,
1989; Tauber, 1998), argue that the essence of cognitive func-
tion involves comparison of a perceived signal with an inter-
nal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon that compar-
ison, the choice of a response from a much larger repertoire of
possible responses. Following the approach of Wallace (2000,
2002a), we make a ‘weak’, and hence very general, model of
that process.
Cognitive pattern recognition-and-response, as we charac-
terize it, proceeds by convoluting an incoming external sen-
sory incoming signal with an internal ongoing activity – the
learned picture of the world – and triggering an appropriate
action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory activ-
ity requires a response. We will, fulfilling Atlan and Cohen’s
(1998) criterion of meaning-from-response, define a language’s
contextual meaning entirely in terms of system output, leav-
ing out, for the moment, the question of how such a pattern
recognition system is trained, a matter for Rate Distortion
theory.
The abstract model will be illustrated by two neural net-
work examples.
A pattern of sensory input is mixed in some unspecified but
systematic manner with internal ‘ongoing’ activity to create
a path of convoluted signal x = (a0, a1, ..., an, ...). This path
is fed into a highly nonlinear, but otherwise similarly unspec-
ified, decision oscillator which generates an output h(x) that
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is an element of one of two (presumably) disjoint sets B0 and
B1 of possible system responses. We take
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.
Thus we permit a graded response, supposing that if
h(x) ∈ B0
the pattern is not recognized, and if
h(x) ∈ B1
the pattern is recognized and some action bj , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
We are interested in paths x which trigger pattern
recognition-and-response exactly once. That is, given a fixed
initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0, we examine all possi-
ble subsequent paths x beginning with a0 and leading exactly
once to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0 for all
j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n let N(n) be the number of
paths of length n which begin with some particular a0 having
h(a0) ∈ B0 and lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B1. We shall
call such paths ‘meaningful’ and assume N(n) to be consid-
erably less than the number of all possible paths of length n
– pattern recognition-and-response is comparatively rare. We
further assume that the finite limit
H ≡ lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
both exists and is independent of the path x. We will –
not surprisingly – call such a pattern recognition-and-response
cognitive process ergodic. Not all such processes are likely to
be ergodic, implying that H, if it exists, is path dependent,
although extension to ‘nearly’ ergodic processes is straight-
forward.
Invoking Shannon, we may thus define an ergodic in-
formation source X associated with stochastic variates Xj
having joint and conditional probabilities P (a0, ..., an) and
P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such that appropriate joint and conditional
Shannon uncertainties may be defined which satisfy the rela-
tions
H[X] = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
=
lim
n→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1) =
lim
n→∞
H(X0, ..., Xn)
n
.
(1)
The Shannon uncertainties H(...) are defined in terms of
cross-sectional sums of the form −∑k Pk log[Pk], where the
Pk constitute a probability distribution. See Ash (1990) or
Cover and Thomas (1991) for details.
We say this information source is dual to the ergodic cog-
nitive process.
Again, for non-ergodic sources, a limit limn→∞H may be
defined for each path, but it will not necessarily given by
the simple cross-sectional law-of-large numbers analogs above.
For ‘nearly’ ergodic systems one might perhaps use something
of the form
H(x+ δx) ≈ H(x) + δxdH/dx.
Different language-analogs will, of course, be defined by
different divisions of the total universe of possible responses
into different pairs of sets B0 and B1, or by requiring more
than one response in B1 along a path. However, like the use of
different distortion measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem
(e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991), it seems obvious that the
underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively similar.
Similar but not identical, and herein lies the first of two
essential matters: dividing the full set of possible responses
into sets B0 and B1 may itself require higher order cognitive
decisions by another module or modules, suggesting the ne-
cessity of ‘choice’ within a more or less broad set of possible
languages-of-thought. This would, in one way, reflect the need
of the organism to shift gears according to the different chal-
lenges it faces, leading to a model for autocognitive disease
when a normally excited state is recurrently (and incorrectly)
identified as a member of the ‘resting’ set B0.
A second possible source of structure, however, lies at the
input rather than the output end of the model: i.e. sup-
pose we classify paths instead of outputs. That is, we define
equivalence classes in convolutional ‘path space’ according to
whether a state aMk can be connected by a path with some
originating state aM . That is, we, in turn, set each possible
state to an a0, and define other states as formally equiva-
lent to it if they can be reached from that (now variable)
a0 = aM by a grammatical/syntactical path. That is, a state
which can be reached by a legitimate path from aM is taken
as equivalent to it. We can thus divide path space into (ordi-
narily) disjoint sets of equivalence classes. Each equivalence
class defines its own language-of-thought: disjoint cognitive
modules, possibly associated with an embedding equivalence
class algebra.
While meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar
and syntax – are defined entirely in terms of system response,
as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose, a critical task is to make
these (relatively) disjoint cognitive modules interact, and to
examine the effects of that interaction on global properties.
Punctuated phase transition effects will emerge in a natural
manner.
Before proceeding, however, we give two explicit neural net-
work applications.
First the simple stochastic neuron: A series of inputs yji , i =
1...m from m nearby neurons at time j is convoluted with
‘weights’ wji , i = 1...m, using an inner product
aj = yj ·wj =
m∑
i=1
yjiw
j
i
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in the context of a ‘transfer function’ f(yj ·wj) such that the
probability of the neuron firing and having a discrete output
zj = 1 is P (zj = 1) = f(yj ·wj). Thus the probability that
the neuron does not fire at time j is 1− f(yj ·wj).
In the terminology of this section them values yji constitute
‘sensory activity’ and the m weights wji the ‘ongoing activity’
at time j, with aj = yj ·wj and x = a0, a1, ...an, ...
A little more work leads to a fairly standard neural network
model in which the network is trained by appropriately vary-
ing the w through least squares or other error minimization
feedback. This can be shown to, essentially, replicate rate
distortion arguments (Cover and Thomas, 1991), as we can
use the error definition to define a distortion function d(y, yˆ)
which measures the difference between the training pattern y
and the network output yˆ as a function of, for example, the
inverse number of training cycles, K. As discussed in some
detail elsewhere (Wallace, 2002), learning plateau behavior
follows as a phase transition on the parameter K in the mu-
tual information I(Y, Yˆ ).
Park et al. (2000) treat the stochastic neural network
in terms of a space of related probability density functions
[p(x,y;w)|w ∈ Rm], where x is the input, y the output and
w the parameter vector. The goal of learning is to find an op-
timum w∗ which maximizes the log likelihood function. They
define a loss function of learning as
L(x,y;w) ≡ − log p(x,y;w),
and one can take as a learning paradigm the gradient rela-
tion
wt+1 = wt − ηt∂L(x,y;w)/∂w,
where ηt is a learning rate.
Park et al. (2000) attack this optimization problem by
recognizing that the space of p(x,y;w) is Riemannian with a
metric given by the Fisher information matrix
G(w) =
∫ ∫
∂ log p/∂w[∂ log p/∂w]T p(x,y;w)dydx
where T is the transpose operation. A Fisher-efficient on-
line estimator is then obtained by using the ‘natural’ gradient
algorithm
wt+1 = wt − ηtG−1∂L(x,y;w)/∂w.
Again, through the synergistic family of probability distri-
butions p(x,y;w), this can be viewed as a special case – a
‘representation’, to use physics jargon – of the general ‘con-
volution argument’ given above.
It seems likely that a rate distortion analysis of the inter-
action between training language and network response lan-
guage will nonetheless show the ubiquity of learning plateaus,
even in this rather elegant special case.
We will eventually parametize the information source un-
certainty of the dual information source with respect to one
or more variates, writing, e.g. H[K], where K ≡ (K1, ...,Ks)
represents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K
follow some path in time, i.e. trace out a generalized line
or surface K(t). We will, following the argument of Wal-
lace (2002b), assume that the probabilities defining H, for
the most part, closely track changes in K(t), so that along a
particular ‘piece’ of a path in parameter space the informa-
tion source remains as close to memoryless and ergodic as is
needed for the mathematics to work. Between pieces, below,
we will impose phase transition characterized by a renormal-
ization symmetry, in the sense of Wilson (1971).
We will call such an information source ‘adiabatically piece-
wise memoryless ergodic’ (APME).
To anticipate the argument, iterating the analysis on paths
of ‘tuned’ sets of renormalization parameters gives a second
order punctuation in the rate at which primary interacting in-
formation sources representing cognitive submodules become
linked to each other: the shifting workspace structure of con-
sciousness.
Interacting cognitive modules
We suppose that a two (relatively) distinct cognitive sub-
modules can be represented by two distinct sequences of
states, the paths x ≡ x0, x1, ... and y ≡ y0, y1, .... These
paths are, however, both very highly structured and seri-
ally correlated and have dual information sources X and Y.
Since the modules, in reality, interact through some kind
of endless back-and-forth mutual crosstalk, these sequences
of states are not independent, but are jointly serially cor-
related. We can, then, define a path of sequential pairs as
z ≡ (x0, y0), (x1, y1), .... The essential content of the Joint
Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem (JAEPT), a variant of the
Shannon-McMillan Theorem, is that the set of joint paths z
can be partitioned into a relatively small set of high probabil-
ity termed jointly typical, and a much larger set of vanishingly
small probability. Further, according to the JAEPT, the split-
ting criterion between high and low probability sets of pairs
is the mutual information
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
where H(X),H(Y ),H(X|Y ) and H(X,Y ) are, respec-
tively, the (cross-sectional) Shannon uncertainties of X and
Y , their conditional uncertainty, and their joint uncertainty.
See Cover and Thomas (1991) for mathematical details. Sim-
ilar approaches to neural process have been recently adopted
by Dimitrov and Miller (2001).
Note that, using this asymptotic limit theorem approach,
we need not model the exact form or dynamics of the crosstalk
feedback, hence crushing algebraic complexities can be post-
poned until a later stage of the argument. They will, however,
appear in due course with some vengeance.
The high probability pairs of paths are, in this formulation,
all equiprobable, and if N(n) is the number of jointly typical
pairs of length n, then
I(X,Y ) = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
.
Extending the earlier language-on-a-network models of
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999), we suppose there is a cou-
pling parameter P representing the degree of linkage between
the modules, and set K = 1/P , following the development
of those earlier studies. Note that in a brain model this pa-
rameter represents the intensity of coupling between distant
neural structures.
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Then we have
I[K] = lim
n→∞
log[N(K,n)]
n
.
The essential ‘homology’ between information theory and
statistical mechanics lies in the similarity of this expression
with the infinite volume limit of the free energy density. If
Z(K) is the statistical mechanics partition function derived
from the system’s Hamiltonian, then the free energy density
is determined by the relation
F [K] = lim
V→∞
log[Z(K)]
V
.
F is the free energy density, V the system volume and K =
1/T , where T is the system temperature.
We and others argue at some length (Wallace and Wallace,
1998, 1999; Rojdestvensky and Cottam, 2000) that this is
indeed a systematic mathematical homology which, we con-
tend, permits importation of renormalization symmetry into
information theory. Imposition of invariance under renormal-
ization on the mutual information splitting criterion I(X,Y )
implies the existence of phase transitions analogous to learn-
ing plateaus or punctuated evolutionary equilibria. An exten-
sive mathematical development will be presented in the next
section.
The physiological details of mechanism, we speculate, will
be particularly captured by the definitions of coupling param-
eter, renormalization symmetry, and, perhaps, the distribu-
tion of the renormalization across agency, a matter we treat
below.
Here, however, these changes are perhaps better described
as ‘punctuated interpenetration’ between interacting cogni-
tive modules.
We reiterate that the details are highly dependent on the
choice of renormalization symmetry (and its distribution),
which is likely to reflect details of mechanism – the manner in
which the dynamics of the forest are dependent on the detailed
physiology of trees, albeit in a many-to-one manner. Renor-
malization properties are not likely to follow simple physical
analogs, and may well be subject, in addition to complications
of distribution, to the ‘tuning’ of universality class parameters
that are characteristically fixed for simple physical systems.
The algebra is straightforward if complicated, and given later.
Representations of the general argument
1. Language-on-a-network models. Earlier papers of
this series addressed the problem of how a language, in a large
sense, spoken on a network structure responds as properties of
the network change. The language might be speech, pattern
recognition, or cognition. The network might be social, chem-
ical, or neural. The properties of interest were the magnitude
of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ ties which, respectively, either disjointly
partitioned the network or linked it across such partitioning.
These would be analogous to local and mean-field couplings
in physical systems.
We fix the magnitude of strong ties – to reiterate, those
which disjointly partition the underlying network (presum-
ably into cognitive submodules) – but vary the index of weak
ties between components, which we call P , taking K = 1/P .
For interacting neural networks P might simply be taken as
proportional to the degree of crosstalk.
We assume the piecewise, adiabatically memoryless ergodic
information source (Wallace, 2002b) depends on three param-
eters, two explicit and one implicit. The explicit are K as
above and an ‘external field strength’ analog J , which gives a
‘direction’ to the system. We will, in the limit, set J = 0.
The implicit parameter, which we call r, is an inherent gen-
eralized ‘length’ characteristic of the phenomenon, on which
J and K are defined. That is, we can write J and K as
functions of averages of the parameter r, which may be quite
complex, having nothing at all to do with conventional ideas
of space: For example r may be defined by the degree of niche
partitioning in ecosystems or separation in social structures.
For a given generalized language of interest with a well
defined (piecewise adiabatically memoryless) ergodic source
uncertainty H we write
H[K,J,X]
Imposition of invariance of H under a renormalization
transform in the implicit parameter r leads to expectation
of both a critical point in K, which we call KC , reflecting
a phase transition to or from collective behavior across the
entire array, and of power laws for system behavior near KC .
Addition of other parameters to the system, e.g. some V ,
results in a ‘critical line’ or surface KC(V ).
Let κ ≡ (KC−K)/KC and take χ as the ‘correlation length’
defining the average domain in r-space for which the informa-
tion source is primarily dominated by ‘strong’ ties. We begin
by averaging across r-space in terms of ‘clumps’ of length R.
Then, taking Wilson’s (1971) analysis as a starting point, we
choose the renormalization relations as
H[KR, JR,X] = f(R)H[K,J,X]
χ(KR, JR) =
χ(K,J)
R
,
(2)
with f(1) = 1 and J1 = J,K1 = K. The first of these equa-
tions significantly extends Wilson’s treatment. It states that
‘processing capacity,’ as indexed by the source uncertainty of
the system, representing the ‘richness’ of the generalized lan-
guage, grows monotonically as f(R), which must itself be a di-
mensionless function in R, since both H[KR, JR] and H[K,J ]
are themselves dimensionless. Most simply, this would require
that we replace R by R/R0, where R0 is the ‘characteristic
length’ for the system over which renormalization procedures
are reasonable, then set R0 ≡ 1, i.e. measure length in units
of R0. Wilson’s original analysis focused on free energy den-
sity. Under ‘clumping’, densities must remain the same, so
that if F [KR, JR] is the free energy of the clumped system,
and F [K,J ] is the free energy density before clumping, then
Wilson’s equation (4) is F [K,J ] = R−3F [KR, JR], i.e.
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F [KR, JR] = R3F [K,J ].
Remarkably, the renormalization equations are solvable
for a broad class of functions f(R), or more precisely,
f(R/R0), R0 ≡ 1.
The second relation just states that the correlation length
simply scales as R.
Other, very subtle, symmetry relations – not necessarily
based on the elementary physical analog we use here – may
well be possible. For example McCauley, (1993, p.168) de-
scribes the highly counterintuitive renormalization relations
needed to understand phase transition in simple ‘chaotic’ sys-
tems. This is important, since we suspect that biological or
social systems may alter their renormalization properties –
equivalent to tuning their phase transition dynamics – in re-
sponse to external signals. We will make much of this possi-
bility, termed ‘universality class tuning’, below.
To begin, following Wilson, we take f(R) = Rd for some
real number d > 0, and restrict K to near the ‘critical value’
KC . If J → 0, a simple series expansion and some clever
algebra (Wilson, 1971; Binney et al., 1986) gives
H = H0κα
χ =
χ0
κs
(3)
where α, s are positive constants. We provide more biolog-
ically relevant examples below.
Further from the critical point matters are more compli-
cated, appearing to involve Generalized Onsager Relations
and a kind of thermodynamics associated with a Legendre
transform of H, i.e. S ≡ H − KdH/dK (Wallace, 2002a).
Although this extension is quite important to describing be-
haviors away from criticality, the full mathematical detail is
cumbersome and the reader is referred to the references. A
brief discussion will be given below.
An essential insight is that regardless of the particular
renormalization properties, sudden critical point transition is
possible in the opposite direction for this model. That is, we
go from a number of independent, isolated and fragmented
systems operating individually and more or less at random,
into a single large, interlocked, coherent structure, once the
parameter K, the inverse strength of weak ties, falls below
threshold, or, conversely, once the strength of weak ties pa-
rameter P = 1/K becomes large enough.
Thus, increasing nondisjunctive weak ties between them
can bind several different cognitive ‘language’ functions into a
single, embedding hierarchical metalanguage which contains
each as a linked subdialect, and do so in an inherently punc-
tuated manner. This could be a dynamic process, creating a
shifting, ever-changing, pattern of linked cognitive submod-
ules, according to the challenges or opportunities faced by the
organism.
To reiterate somewhat, this heuristic insight can be made
more exact using a rate distortion argument (or, more gener-
ally, using the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem) as
follows (Wallace, 2002a, b):
Suppose that two ergodic information sources Y and B
begin to interact, to ‘talk’ to each other, i.e. to influence
each other in some way so that it is possible, for example,
to look at the output of B – strings b – and infer something
about the behavior of Y from it – strings y. We suppose it
possible to define a retranslation from the B-language into
the Y-language through a deterministic code book, and call
Yˆ the translated information source, as mirrored by B.
Define some distortion measure comparing paths y to paths
yˆ, d(y, yˆ) (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We invoke the Rate Dis-
tortion Theorem’s mutual information I(Y, Yˆ ), which is the
splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of
paths. Impose, now, a parametization by an inverse coupling
strengthK, and a renormalization symmetry representing the
global structure of the system coupling. This may be much
different from the renormalization behavior of the individual
components. If K < KC , where KC is a critical point (or
surface), the two information sources will be closely coupled
enough to be characterized as condensed.
In the absence of a distortion measure, we can invoke the
Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem to obtain a similar
result.
We suggest in particular that detailed coupling mechanisms
will be sharply constrained through regularities of grammar
and syntax imposed by limit theorems associated with phase
transition.
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999) and Wallace (2002) use
this approach to address certain evolutionary processes in a
relatively unified fashion. These papers, and those of Wal-
lace and Fullilove (1999) and Wallace (2002a), further de-
scribe how biological or social systems might respond to gradi-
ents in information source uncertainty and related quantities
when the system is away from phase transition. Language-on-
network systems, as opposed to physical systems, appear to
diffuse away from concentrations of an ‘instability’ construct
which is related to a Legendre transform of information source
uncertainty, in much the same way entropy is the Legendre
transform of free energy density in a physical system.
Simple thermodynamics addresses physical systems held at
or near equilibrium conditions. Treatment of nonequilibrium,
for example highly dynamic, systems requires significant ex-
tension of thermodynamic theory. The most direct approach
has been the first-order phenomenological theory of Onsager,
which involves relating first order rate changes in system pa-
rametersKj to gradients in physical entropy S, involving ‘On-
sager relation’ equations of the form∑
k
Rk,jdKj/dt = ∂S/∂Kj ,
where the Rk,j are characteristic constants of a particular
system and S is defined to be the Legendre transform free
energy density F ;
S ≡ F −
∑
j
∂F/∂Kj .
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The entropy-analog for an information system is, then, the
dimensionless quantity
S ≡ H −
∑
j
Kj∂H/∂Kj ,
or a similar equation in the mutual information I.
Note that in this treatment I or H play the role of free
energy, not entropy, and that their Legendre transform plays
the role of physical entropy. This is a key matter.
For information systems, a parametized ‘instability’,
Q[K] ≡ S − H, is defined from the principal splitting cri-
terion by the relations
Q[K] = −KdH[K]/dK
Q[K] = −KdI[K]/dK
(4)
where H[K] and I[K] are, respectively, information
source uncertainty or mutual information in the Asymptotic
Equipartition, Rate Distortion, or Joint Asymptotic Equipar-
tition Theorems.
Extension of thermodynamic theory to information systems
involves a first order system phenomenological equations anal-
ogous to the Onsager relations, but possibly having very com-
plicated behavior in the Rj,k, in particular not necessarily
producing simple diffusion toward peaks in S. For example,
as discussed, there is evidence that social network structures
are affected by diffusion away from concentrations in the S-
analog. Thus the phenomenological relations affecting the
dynamics of information networks, which are inherently open
systems, may not be governed simply by mechanistic diffusion
toward ‘peaks in entropy’, but may, in first order, display more
complicated behavior.
2. ‘Biological’ phase transitions. Now the mathemati-
cal detail concealed by the invocation of the asymptotic limit
theorems emerges with a vengeance. Equation (2) states that
the information source and the correlation length, the degree
of coherence on the underlying network, scale under renor-
malization clustering in chunks of size R as
H[KR, JR]/f(R) = H[J,K]
χ[KR, JR]R = χ(K,J),
with f(1) = 1,K1 = K,J1 = J , where we have slightly
rearranged terms.
Differentiating these two equations with respect to R, so
that the right hand sides are zero, and solving for dKR/dR
and dJR/dR gives, after some consolidation, expressions of
the form
dKR/dR = u1d log(f)/dR+ u2/R
dJR/dR = v1JRd log(f)/dR+
v2
R
JR.
(5)
The ui, vi, i = 1, 2 are functions of KR, JR, but not explic-
itly of R itself.
We expand these equations about the critical value KR =
KC and about JR = 0, obtaining
dKR/dR = (KR −KC)yd log(f)/dR+ (KR −KC)z/R
dJR/dR = wJRd log(f)/dR+ xJR/R.
(6)
The terms y = du1/dKR|KR=KC , z =
du2/dKR|KR=KC , w = v1(KC , 0), x = v2(KC , 0) are
constants.
Solving the first of these equations gives
KR = KC + (K −KC)Rzf(R)y,
(7)
again remembering that K1 = K,J1 = J, f(1) = 1.
Wilson’s essential trick is to iterate on this relation, which
is supposed to converge rapidly (Binney, 1986), assuming that
for KR near KC , we have
KC/2 ≈ KC + (K −KC)Rzf(R)y.
(8)
We iterate in two steps, first solving this for f(R) in terms
of known values, and then solving for R, finding a value RC
that we then substitute into the first of equations (2) to obtain
an expression for H[K, 0] in terms of known functions and
parameter values.
The first step gives the general result
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f(RC) ≈ [KC/(KC −K)]
1/y
21/yRz/yC
.
(9)
Solving this for RC and substituting into the first of equa-
tion (2) gives, as a first iteration of a far more general proce-
dure (e.g. Shirkov and Kovalev, 2001)
H[K, 0] ≈ H[KC/2, 0]
f(RC)
=
H0
f(RC)
χ(K, 0) ≈ χ(KC/2, 0)RC = χ0RC
(10)
which are the essential relationships.
Note that a power law of the form f(R) = Rm,m = 3,
which is the direct physical analog, may not be biologically
reasonable, since it says that ‘language richness’ can grow
very rapidly as a function of increased network size. Such
rapid growth is simply not observed.
If we take the biologically realistic example of non-integral
‘fractal’ exponential growth,
f(R) = Rδ,
(11)
where δ > 0 is a real number which may be quite small, we
can solve equation (8) for RC , obtaining
RC =
[KC/(KC −K)][1/(δy+z)]
21/(δy+z)
(12)
for K near KC . Note that, for a given value of y, we might
want to characterize the relation α ≡ δy + z = constant as
a “tunable universality class relation” in the sense of Albert
and Barabasi (2002).
Substituting this value for RC back into equation (9) gives
a somewhat more complex expression for H than equation
(2), having three parameters, i.e. δ, y, z.
A more biologically interesting choice for f(R) is a loga-
rithmic curve that ‘tops out’, for example
f(R) = m log(R) + 1.
(13)
Again f(1) = 1.
Using Mathematica 4.2 to solve equation (8) for RC gives
RC = [
Q
LambertW [Q exp(z/my)]
]y/z,
(14)
where
Q ≡ [(z/my)2−1/y[KCKC −K)]1/y.
The transcendental function LambertW(x) is defined by the
relation
LambertW (x) exp(LambertW (x)) = x.
It arises in the theory of random networks and in renormal-
ization strategies for quantum field theories.
An asymptotic relation for f(R) would be of particular bi-
ological interest, implying that ‘language richness’ increases
to a limiting value with population growth. Such a pattern
is broadly consistent with calculations of the degree of allelic
heterozygosity as a function of population size under a bal-
ance between genetic drift and neutral mutation (Hartl and
Clark, 1997; Ridley, 1996). Taking
f(R) = exp[m(R− 1)/R]
(15)
gives a system which begins at 1 when R=1, and approaches
the asymptotic limit exp(m) as R → ∞. Mathematica 4.2
finds
RC =
my/z
LambertW [S]
(16)
where
S ≡ (my/z) exp(my/z)[21/y[KC/(KC −K)]−1/y]y/z.
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(16)
These developments indicate the possibility of taking the
theory significantly beyond arguments by abduction from sim-
ple physical models, although the notorious difficulty of im-
plementing information theory existence arguments will un-
doubtedly persist.
3. Universality class distribution. Physical sys-
tems undergoing phase transition usually have relatively
pure renormalization properties, with quite different systems
clumped into the same ‘universality class’, having fixed expo-
nents at transition (e.g. Binney, 1986). Biological and social
phenomena may be far more complicated:
If we suppose the system of interest to be a mix of sub-
groups with different values of some significant renormaliza-
tion parameter m in the expression for f(R,m), according to
a distribution ρ(m), then we expect the first expression in
equation (1) to generalize as
H[KR, JR] =< f(R,m) > H[K,J ]
≡ H[K,J ]
∫
f(R,m)ρ(m)dm.
(17)
If f(R) = 1 +m log(R) then, given any distribution for m,
we simply obtain
< f(R) >= 1+ < m > log(R)
(18)
where < m > is simply the mean of m over that distribu-
tion.
Other forms of f(R) having more complicated dependencies
on the distributed parameter or parameters, like the power
law Rδ, do not produce such a simple result. Taking ρ(δ) as
a normal distribution, for example, gives
< Rδ >= R<δ> exp[(1/2)(log(Rσ))2],
(19)
where σ2 is the distribution variance. The renormalization
properties of this function can be determined from equation
(8), and is left to the reader as an exercise, best done in
Mathematica 4.2 or above.
Thus the information dynamic phase transition properties
of mixed systems will not in general be simply related to those
of a single subcomponent, a matter of possible empirical im-
portance: If sets of relevant parameters defining renormaliza-
tion universality classes are indeed distributed, experiments
observing pure phase changes may be very difficult. Tun-
ing among different possible renormalization strategies in re-
sponse to external pressures would result in even greater am-
biguity in recognizing and classifying information dynamic
phase transitions.
We believe that important aspects of mechanism may be
reflected in the combination of renormalization properties and
the details of their distribution across subsystems.
In sum, real biological, social, or interacting biopsychosocial
systems are likely to have very rich patterns of phase transi-
tion which may not display the simplistic, indeed, literally
elemental, purity familiar to physicists. Overall mechanisms
will, we believe, still remain significantly constrained by our
theory, in the general sense of probability limit theorems.
4. Universality class tuning: the fluctuating dy-
namic threshold Next we iterate the general argument onto
the process of phase transition itself, producing our model of
consciousness as a tunable neural workspace subject to inher-
ent punctuated detection of external events.
An essential character of physical systems subject to phase
transition is that they belong to particular ‘universality
classes’. This means that the exponents of power laws de-
scribing behavior at phase transition will be the same for large
groups of markedly different systems, with ‘natural’ aggrega-
tions representing fundamental class properties (e.g. Binney
et al., 1986).
It is our contention that biological or social systems un-
dergoing phase transition analogs need not be constrained to
such classes, and that ‘universality class tuning’, meaning the
strategic alteration of parameters characterizing the renor-
malization properties of punctuation, might well be possible.
Here we focus on the tuning of parameters within a single,
given, renormalization relation. Clearly, however, wholesale
shifts of renormalization properties must ultimately be con-
sidered as well.
Universality class tuning has been observed in models of
‘real world’ networks. As Albert and Barabasi (2002) put it,
“The inseparability of the topology and dynam-
ics of evolving networks is shown by the fact that
[the exponents defining universality class] are related
by [a] scaling relation..., underlying the fact that a
network’s assembly uniquely determines its topol-
ogy. However, in no case are these exponents unique.
They can be tuned continuously...”
We suppose that a structured external environment, which
we take itself to be an appropriately regular information
source Y ‘engages’ a modifiable cognitive system. The en-
vironment begins to write an image of itself on the cognitive
system in a distorted manner permitting definition of a mu-
tual information I[K] splitting criterion according to the Rate
Distortion or Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorems. K
is an inverse coupling parameter between system and environ-
ment (Wallace, 2002a, b). According to our development, at
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punctuation – near some critical point KC – the systems be-
gin to interact very strongly indeed, and we may write, near
KC , taking as the starting point the simple physical model of
equation (2),
I[K] ≈ I0[KC −K
KC
]α.
For a physical system α is fixed, determined by the under-
lying ‘universality class’. Here we will allow α to vary, and,
in the section below, to itself respond explicitly to signals.
Normalizing KC and I0 to 1, we obtain,
I[K] ≈ (1−K)α.
(20)
The horizontal line I[K] = 1 corresponds to α = 0, while
α = 1 gives a declining straight line with unit slope which
passes through 0 at K = 1. Consideration shows there are
progressively sharper transitions between the necessary zero
value at K = 1 and the values defined by this relation for
0 < K,α < 1. The rapidly rising slope of transition with
declining α is, we assert, of considerable significance.
The instability associated with the splitting criterion I[K]
is defined by
Q[K] ≡ −KdI[K]/dK = αK(1−K)α−1,
(21)
and is singular at K = KC = 1 for 0 < α < 1. Following
earlier work (Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999; Wallace and
Fullilove, 1999; Wallace, 2002a), we interpret this to mean
that values of 0 < α 1 are highly unlikely for real systems,
since Q[K], in this model, represents a kind of barrier for
information systems, in particular neural networks.
On the other hand, smaller values of α mean that the sys-
tem is far more efficient at responding to the adaptive de-
mands imposed by the embedding structured environment,
since the mutual information which tracks the matching of
internal response to external demands, I[K], rises more and
more quickly toward the maximum for smaller and smaller α
as the inverse coupling parameter K declines below KC = 1.
That is, systems able to attain smaller α are more responsive
to external signals than those characterized by larger values, in
this model, but smaller values will be hard to reach, and can
probably be done so only at some considerable physiological
or opportunity cost: focused conscious action takes resources,
of one form or another.
The more biologically realistic renormalization strategies
given above produce sets of several parameters defining the
universality class, whose tuning gives behavior much like that
of α in this simple example.
We can formally iterate the phase transition argument on
this calculation to obtain our version of tunable consciousness,
focusing on paths of universality class parameters.
Suppose the renormalization properties of a language-on-
a network system at some ‘time’ k are characterized by a
set of parameters Ak ≡ αk1 , ..., αkm. Fixed parameter val-
ues define a particular universality class for the renormal-
ization. We suppose that, over a sequence of ‘times’, the
universality class properties can be characterized by a path
xn = A0, A1, ..., An−1 having significant serial correlations
which, in fact, permit definition of an adiabatically piece-
wise memoryless ergodic information source associated with
the paths xn. We call that source X.
We further suppose, in the manner of Wallace (2002a, b),
that the set of external signals is also highly structured and
forms another information source Y which interacts not only
with the system of interest globally, but specifically with its
universality class properties as characterized by X. Y is nec-
essarily associated with a set of paths yn.
We pair the two sets of paths into a joint path, zn ≡ (xn, yy)
and invoke an inverse coupling parameter, K, between the
information sources and their paths. This leads, by the ar-
guments above, to phase transition punctuation of I[K], the
mutual information between X and Y, under either the Joint
Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem or under limitation by
a distortion measure, through the Rate Distortion Theorem
(Cover and Thomas, 1991). Again, see Wallace (2002a, b)
for more details of the argument. The essential point is that
I[K] is a splitting criterion under these theorems, and thus
partakes of the homology with free energy density which we
have invoked above.
Activation of universality class tuning, our version of at-
tentional focusing, then becomes itself a punctuated event in
response to increasing linkage between the organism and an
external structured signal.
We note in passing, but without further calculation, that
another path to the fluctuating dynamic threshold might be
through a second order iteration similar to that just above,
but focused on the parameters defining the universality class
distributions of section 3.
Extending the model
The Rate Distortion and Joint Asymptotic Equipartition
Theorems are generalizations of the Shannon-McMillan Theo-
rem which examine the interaction of two information sources,
with and without the constraint of a fixed average distortion.
We conduct one more iteration, and require a generalization
of the SMT in terms of the splitting criterion for triplets as
opposed to single or double stranded patterns. The tool for
this is at the core of what is termed network information the-
ory [Cover and Thomas, 1991, Theorem 14.2.3]. Suppose we
have three (piecewise adiabatically memoryless) ergodic in-
formation sources, Y1, Y2 and Y3. We assume Y3 constitutes a
critical embedding context for Y1 and Y2 so that, given three
sequences of length n, the probability of a particular triplet
of sequences is determined by conditional probabilities with
respect to Y3:
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P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, Y3 = y3) =
Πni=1p(y1i|y3i)p(y2i|y3i)p(y3i).
(22)
That is, Y1 and Y2 are, in some measure, driven by their
interaction with Y3
Then, in analogy with previous analyses, triplets of se-
quences can be divided by a splitting criterion into two sets,
having high and low probabilities respectively. For large n the
number of triplet sequences in the high probability set will be
determined by the relation [Cover and Thomas, 1992, p. 387]
N(n) ∝ exp[nI(Y1;Y2|Y3)],
(23)
where splitting criterion is given by
I(Y1;Y2|Y3) ≡
H(Y3) +H(Y1|Y3) +H(Y2|Y3)−H(Y1, Y2, Y3)
We can then examine mixed cognitive/adaptive phase tran-
sitions analogous to learning plateaus (Wallace, 2002b) in the
splitting criterion I(Y1, Y2|Y3), which characterizes the syn-
ergistic interaction between Y3, taken as an embedding con-
text, and the cognitive processes characterized by Y1 and Y2.
These transitions delineate the various stages of the chronic
infection, which are embodied in the slowly varying ‘piece-
wise adiabatically memoryless ergodic’ phase between tran-
sitions. Again, our results are exactly analogous to the El-
dredge/Gould model of evolutionary punctuated equilibrium.
We can, if necessary, extend this model to any number of
interacting information sources, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys conditional on
an external context Z in terms of a splitting criterion defined
by
I(Y1; ...;Ys|Z) = H(Z) +
s∑
j=1
H(Yj |Z)−H(Y1, ..., Ys, Z),
(24)
where the conditional Shannon uncertainties H(Yj |Z) are
determined by the appropriate direct and conditional proba-
bilities.
Note that this simple-seeming extension opens a Pandora’s
box in the study of ‘mind-body interaction’ and the impacts
of culture on individual cognition. We now have a tool for
examining the interpenetration of a broad range of cognitive
physiological, psychological, and social submodules – not just
neural substructures – with each other and with embedding
contextual cultural language so characteristic of human hy-
persociality, all within the further context of structured psy-
chosocial stress. Wallace (2003) analyzes the implications
for understanding comorbid mind/body dysfunction, and pro-
vides a laundry list of physiological, psychological, and social
cognitive modules associated with health and disease.
Bennett and Hacker (2003) define the ‘mereological fallacy’
in neuroscience as the assignment, to parts of an animal,
of those characteristics which are properties of the whole.
Humans, through both their embedding in cognitive social
networks, and their secondary epigenetic inheritance system
of culture, are even more than ‘simply’ individual animals.
Equation (24) implies the possibility of extending the global
neuronal workspace model of consciousness to include both
internal cognitive physiological systems and embedding cog-
nitive and other structures, providing a natural approach to
evading that fallacy.
Equation (24) is itself subject to significant generalization.
The single information source Z is seen here as invariant,
not affected by, but affecting, cross talk with the informa-
tion sources for which it serves as the driving context. Sup-
pose there is an interacting system of contexts, acting more
slowly than the global neuronal workspace, but communicat-
ing within itself. It should be possible, at first order, to divide
the full system into two sections, one ‘fast’, containing the
Yj , and the other ‘slow’, containing the series of information
sources Zk. The fast system instantiates the conscious neu-
ronal workspace, including crosstalk, while the slow system
constitutes an embedding context for the fast, but one which
engages in its own pattern of crosstalk. Then the extended
splitting criterion, which we write as
I(Y1, ..., Yj |Z1, ..., Zk),
becomes something far more complicated than equation
(24). This must be expressed in terms of sums of appropriate
Shannon uncertainties, a complex task which will be individ-
ually contingent on the particular forms of context and their
interrelations.
Discussion and conclusions
We have constructed a punctuated information dynamic
global neuronal workspace model which incorporates a
second-order and similarly punctuated universality class tun-
ing linked to detection of structured external signals. Tuning
the punctuated activation of attention to those signals per-
mits more rapid and appropriate response, but at increased
physiological or other opportunity cost: unconscious process-
ing is clearly more efficient, if the organism can get away with
it. On the other hand, if the organism can’t get away with it,
death is more likely, suggesting a strong evolutionary imper-
ative for a dynamic global neural workspace.
Linkage across individual dynamic workspaces – i.e. human
hypersociality in the context of an embedding epigenetic cul-
tural inheritance system – would be even more adaptationally
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efficient. Indeed, the last equation and its proposed exten-
sion suggest the possibility of very strong linkage of individual
consciousness and physiology to embedding sociocultural net-
work phenomena, ultimately producing an extended model of
consciousness which does not fall victim to the mereological
fallacy.
In just this regard Nisbett et al. (2001) review an extensive
literature on empirical studies of basic cognitive differences
between individuals raised in what they call ‘East Asian’ and
‘Western’ cultural heritages, which they characterize, respec-
tively, as ‘holistic’ and ‘analytic’. They find:
1. Social organization directs attention to some aspects of
the perceptual field at the expense of others.
2. What is attended to influences metaphysics.
3. Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs
about the nature of the world and causality.
4. Epistemology dictates the development and application
of some cognitive processes at the expense of others.
5. Social organization can directly affect the plausibility of
metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality should
be regarded as residing in the field vs. in the object.
6. Social organization and social practice can directly in-
fluence the development and use of cognitive processes such
as dialectical vs. logical ones.
Nisbett et al. (2001) conclude that tools of thought em-
body a culture’s intellectual history, that tools have theories
built into them, and that users accept these theories, albeit
unknowingly, when they use these tools.
Individual consciousness – currently defined in terms of the
global neuronal workspace – appears to be profoundly affected
by cultural, and perhaps developmental, context, and, we
aver, by patterns of embedding psychosocial stress, all mat-
ters subject to a direct empirical study which may lead to an
extension of the concept particularly useful in understanding
certain forms of psychopathology.
From even limited theoretical perspectives, current dy-
namic systems models of neural networks, or their computer
simulations, simply do not reflect the imperatives of Adams’
(2003) informational turn in philosophy. On the other hand,
dynamic systems models based on differential equations, or
their difference equation realizations on computers, have a
history of intense and continuous intellectual development go-
ing back to Isaac Newton. Hence very little new mathematics
needs to be done, and one can look up most of the needed re-
sults in the textbooks, which are quite sophisticated by now.
Rigorous probability theory is perhaps a hundred years old,
and its information theory subset has seen barely a half cen-
tury. Consequently the mathematics can’t always be looked
up, and sometimes must even be created de novo, at no small
difficulty. One is reminded, not originally, of a drunk looking
for his lost car keys under a street lamp ‘because the light is
better here’.
Virtually all self-proclaimed applications of information
theory to the dynamic neural workspace currently in the neu-
roscience literature have strayed far indeed from the draco-
nian structural discipline imposed by the asymptotic limit
theorems of the subject: information measures are of no fun-
damental interest in and of themselves, serving only as grist
for the mills of splitting criteria between high and low prob-
ability sets of dynamic paths. This is the central mechanism
whose extension, using a homology with free energy density,
permits exploration of punctuated neural dynamics in a man-
ner consistent with the program described by Adams (2003).
According to the mathematical ecologist E.C. Pielou (1976,
p.106), the legitimate purpose of mathematical models is to
raise questions for empirical study, not to answer them, or,
as one wag put it, “all models are wrong, but some models
are useful”. The natural emergence of tunable punctuated
dynamics in our treatment, albeit at the expense of elabo-
rate renormalization calculations at transition, and general-
ized Onsager relations away from it, suggests the possible util-
ity of the theory in future empirical studies of consciousness:
the car keys really may have been lost in the dark parking lot
down the street, but here is a new flashlight.
We have outlined an empirically-testable approach to mod-
eling consciousness which returns with a resounding thump
to the classic asymptotic limit theorems of communication
theory, and suggests further the necessity of incorporating
the effects of embedding structures of psychosocial stress and
culture. The theory suffers from a painful grandiosity, claim-
ing to incorporate matters of cognition, consciousness, social
system, and culture into a single all-encompassing model. To
quote from a recent review of Bennett and Hacker’s new book,
(Patterson, 2003), however, contemporary neuroscience itself
may suffer a more pernicious and deadly form of that disorder
for which our approach is, in fact, the antidote:
“[Bennett and Hacker] argue that for some neuro-
scientists, the brain does all manner of things: it be-
lieves (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blake-
more); poses questions to itself (Young); makes de-
cisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and
represents information (Marr). Implicit in these as-
sertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it un-
reasonably inflates the conception of the ‘brain’ by
assigning to it powers and activities that are nor-
mally reserved for sentient beings... these claims are
not false; rather they are devoid of sense.”
This is but one example of a swelling critical chorus which
will grow markedly in virulence and influence. Our develop-
ment, or some related version, leads toward explicit incorpo-
ration of the full ‘sentient being’ into observational studies
of consciousness. For humans, whose hypersociality is both
glory and bane, this particularly involves understanding the
effects of embedding social and cultural context on immediate
conscious experience.
The bottom line would seem to be the urgent necessity of
extending the perspective of Nisbett et al. (2001) to brain
imaging and other empirical studies of consciousness, and ex-
tending the global neuronal workspace model accordingly, a
matter which our development here suggests is indeed possi-
ble, if not straightforward.
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